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This essay suggests that Continental Studies of Evil need a more global approach
in thinking about political evils of today. Highlighting the need for a more
comparative and global perspective, I explore two proposals: !rst, the in-between
space of the geographical binaries of East/West and Global South/Global North
cultivates many political evils. Second, taking issue with the conviction in
Continental philosophy that the Holocaust caused a rupture in the thinking of
evil, I argue for the continuity of evils and characterize the insistence on the
unprecedented character of the Holocaust as an example of Eurocentrism.
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Decentering Europe in the Thinking of Evil
One can talk about the production and distribution of evils in
the same manner one talks about the production and
distribution of goods or merchandise. 
––Adi Ophir, The Order of Evils
          hat the Western philosophical canon has a Eurocentric vision
is no longer news. However, the canon’s often limited
preoccupation with political evils, con!ned to the borders of Euro-
America, still begs for scrutiny. A Eurocentric perspective, however
sophisticated and well established it is, inevitably falls short of
understanding how events and acts come to be valorized as “evil”
in other parts of the world. Terrorism, genocide, and genocide
denialism are forms of political evil that continue to challenge the
conditions for upholding peace and justice for humans on a global
scale. This is why contemporary philosophical studies of evil
would greatly bene!t from a more global approach, one that takes
seriously multi-sited perspectives and cross-cultural elements that
should inform our ways of knowing and understanding the
political evils of our times. 
One way to intervene and disrupt philosophy’s conventionalism is
to introduce applied and interdisciplinary methodologies,
administered with a view to broadening philosophy’s horizons
beyond the Euro-American comfort zone. Especially within
Continental philosophy, where my scholarship is based,
approaching political evils by transcending the disciplinary limits
of philosophy has proven very fruitful. Following the legacy of
Hannah Arendt, Theodor Adorno, and Michel Foucault, such a
philosophical orientation demands that concepts are produced in
concordance with real-life experiences, structures, and
mechanisms. Not only did these thinkers work with real-life events
and issues, they also employed interdisciplinary theoretical kits.
Building on their legacy, it is incumbent upon us Global South
scholars to bring Western (and non-Western) philosophical
conceptualizations into contact with cases beyond the Euro-
American geographical zone in pursuit of far-reaching
conceptualizations of political evils.
 
In proposing a conversation within Continental studies for a more
internationally enriched discussion of evil, I will discuss two
issues. First, if the task is to analyze the social and political
production of evils (1) from a non-Eurocentric and more global
perspective, then one way to go about this is to care for the in-







                    Genocide denial is a
peculiar phenomenon that
speaks to the ontology of evil.
Here, the evilness of an evil
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Global South/Global North, discursively rigidi!ed and
epistemically charged as these binaries are. Postcolonial and
decolonial studies as well as critical historical perspectives are
invaluable in attending to that in-between space where many
political evils come to fruition. A second issue emerges from
re"ecting on the implications of the well-known conviction in
Continental philosophy that the Holocaust caused a rupture in the
thinking of evil, and that this was because it presented an evil
unknown before. In what follows, I will expand on both of these
issues to elucidate and exemplify the contours of my proposal. 
In response to the !rst issue: in my own research, having a global
approach means being critically aware of the disproportionately
unjust division of the world in terms of capital (epistemic,
!nancial, cultural, and so on), in terms of goods, and in terms of
evils. This translates into an insistence on thinking with the
difference as well as thinking the productive effect of that difference
between East and West, Global South and Global North; and more
speci!cally, thinking how this oppositional, binary formation of
worlds becomes productive in the implementation and distribution
of social and political evils. To give you an idea of what this means,
in my research on the ideologies governing the Armenian
Genocide, I saw that the Turkish supremacist Ottoman elite (the
Young Turks)—who seized political power in 1908 and who then
ordered the systematic killings of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915
(2) (during World War I)—were greatly in"uenced by the dominant
ideologies of 19th century Europe. (3) This was not surprising to me
because I had read Dipesh Chakrabarty’s Provincializing Europe
(4) and knew that “the phenomenon of ‘political modernity’—
namely, the rule by modern institutions of the state, bureaucracy,
and capitalist enterprise—is impossible to think of anywhere in
the world without invoking certain categories and concepts, the
genealogies of which go deep into… Europe.” (5) Here, the
postcolonial outlook encourages us to seek out the connection
between 19th century European ideologies and the early 20th
century political evils of the Young Turks.
Social Darwinism was one of the leading ideologies Ottoman elites
endorsed at the turn of the century, alongside other nationalist
and racial theories, and Turkism is the prevalent social Darwinist
ideology that they created and maintained, and which continues to
be the backbone of contemporary Turkish nationalism. The Young
Turks’ predecessors were the Young Ottomans, another in"uential
political movement of the mid-19th century. This was a movement
in the vein of European political movements like “Young Germany”
and “Young Italy.” (6)
In order to be more speci!c about the productive effect of the
relation between 19th century Europe and late Ottoman political
thought and action, I named a condition that characterized the
collective mindset of the Young Turks: mimicry in hostility, (7) an
ambiguous emotional attachment characterized by a combination
of competitive hostility with, admiration of, and mimicry of
Western and Russian imperialism. My view is that the evils of the
Young Turks cannot be clearly understood if divorced from this
constitutive condition of their collective mindset. Indeed, the
degrees of admiration for and hostility towards the Western (and
Russian) powers changed with respect to the Ottoman elites’
event is not readily evident to
the public because the evil in
question was socially and
politically produced by the
same ideology that continues
to shape the collective social
imagination of that very
public.
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stance in relation to European Orientalism. (8) As the Ottoman
empire began to collapse in the late 19th century, social Darwinism
became the dominant ideology of in"uential Ottoman elites; the
“survival of the species” trope allowed them to distinguish Turks
as a distinct nation, through which they envisioned the nation as a
competing power among the imperialist and colonialist European
nations.  
 
The genocidal will of the Young Turks was a product of this milieu,
steeped in a hybrid lust for power (a hybrid between the older
form of Ottoman imperialism and the newer racialist-nationalist
European paradigm of social Darwinism), a legacy of their imperial
past now rationalized under the banner of “survival of the species”
(or “race”). 
On the role of social Darwinism in the implementation of 20th
century genocides, Robert Bernasconi is critical of Arendt’s lack of
attention to this widespread ideology. (9)Arendt’s resistance to
locating the Holocaust within a wider milieu of 20th century
genocides seems to be related to a particular conviction I alluded
to earlier within Continental studies of evil. This brings me to the
second issue I would like to address. This conviction, nicely
formulated by Richard J. Bernstein, is “that the evil that burst forth
during the Nazi period indicated a rupture with tradition and
revealed the total inadequacy of traditional accounts of morals and
ethics to deal with evil.” (10) This conviction stirred an uneasiness
in me when I !rst read of it in Bernstein’s famous Radical Evil. (11)
The insistence on the rupture and the unprecedented character of
the Holocaust—is it an example of the legacy of Eurocentrism?
Leaving aside this question for now, I will make a brief detour to
articulate where this uneasiness landed me in my studies on evil.
As an international scholar from Turkey, a country whose of!cial
policy denies the Armenian Genocide, I, along with other Turkish
and Armenian colleagues, have long felt a personal responsibility
to address this historical and continuing act of evil perpetrated by
the Turkish state. Genocide denial is a peculiar phenomenon that
speaks to the ontology of evil. Here, the evilness of an evil event is
not readily evident to the public because the evil in question was
socially and politically produced by the same ideology that
continues to shape the collective social imagination of that very
public. Since it is this public that appraises what falls under the
category of evil, there is an impasse. It is this very problem that
makes genocide denialism such a powerful and urgent problem for
contemporary philosophical studies of evil.
                   it is incumbent upon
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Western) philosophical
conceptualizations into
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Photo of Icon of martyrs of the Armenian Genocide, painting in the Mother See of Holy
Echmiadzin Cathedral, Vagharshapat, Armenia (2018) ; Image credit: "ickr
I was able to recognize this problem after reading Adi Ophir’s
brilliant work The Order of Evils. (12) Ophir’s phenomenological
approach offers a view of the conditions of production and
distribution of evils, motivating me to develop a perspective that
focuses on the gap between the occurrence of a harmful act and the
failure to grasp that harmful occurrence under the category of evil.
This is precisely what denial does: it prevents the harm from being
represented under the category of evil. Ophir’s articulation of an
ontological difference “between a space in which damage and loss
appear and the space in which suffering appears” (13) suggests that
the suffering is not ontologically tied to the damage and loss, that
suffering has its own existential ground as a particular experience
of the sufferer, distinct from the fact of loss and damage. Now,
imagine that the initial damage and loss has not even been
counted. This inevitably causes another order of suffering that
does not merely originate from the initial experience of damage
and loss, but rather arises because of the act of not counting (i.e., the
denial of ) that initial loss. It is in this way that genocide denial
multiplies the suffering of the initial loss and damage in"icted on
the victims of genocide. 
Ophir distinguishes two orders of evil: a !rst-order evil is “the one
that did not !nd expression” as evil, while a second-order evil is
“the one tied to the prevention of expression.” (14) These two
orders of evil, read in light of the denial of Armenian Genocide, (15)
convey the point that genocide denial presents a combination of
both orders of evil. On the one hand, the fact of genocide is denied,
and therefore this evil event does not !nd an expression as evil
(i.e., the !rst order of evil). On the other hand, the regime of denial
prevents articulations of this evil from being made by creating a
social and political climate that criminalizes the act of announcing
the past harm done (i.e., the second order of evil). In contemporary
Turkey, a major evil (the Armenian Genocide) has no signi!cant
presence in the collective social imagination of the Turkish people.
(16)The absence of this major evildoing is maintained by
institutional lies, as well as by historical revisions and
rationalizations, made through institutional politics. 
In exploring genocide denial’s particular place in the ontology of
evil, I grounded myself in Continental studies of evil, wherein I
noticed that not all genocides were as widely recognized as the
Shoah. Reading Bernasconi’s “When the Real Crime Began,” (17) I
was pleased to see that my uneasiness was not unfounded. The
opening remarks of the chapter suggest that Black philosophers
had been disturbed, as early as the mid-20th century, by the
tendency to highlight the unprecedented nature of the Nazis’
crimes against humanity. Despite numerous Black philosophers’
rejection of “isolat[ing] the Nazi genocide from the history of the
West,” (18) many scholars early on agreed that the Holocaust was a
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rupture (an exception). 
Was the Holocaust not an intensi!ed version of the evil of
colonialism and other genocidal practices of the early 20th
century, yet this time taking place in the heart of Europe, and
implemented with much more effective use of the “scienti!c”
racism and technologies of the day? (19) I think it was. And
recently, critical Holocaust scholars have been pointing out the
ethical and political implications of viewing the Shoah as an
exception. (20)
It is well known that anti-Semitism had been a form of governance
in Europe centuries before the Nazis came to power. The Nazis
radically intensi!ed and multiplied anti-Semitic policies. Before
1933, the German military had already practiced the extermination
of the Herero people in southwest Africa and violently attacked the
Boxer Rebellion in China and the Maji-Maji Uprising in East Africa.
(21) Historians like Hans-Lukas Kieser note that popular history
covered over the German military’s experience as an Ottoman ally
in Anatolia during World War I, as members of the German
military witnessed !rsthand the extermination of Armenians. (22)
Moreover, Stefan Ihrig’s account (23) sheds light on how, even well
before World War I, the 1890s Armenian massacres were very well
known to German of!cials and the public alike. Disturbingly
enough, many Germans were in support of criminal Ottoman
policies against Armenians, according to Ihrig: “beginning in 1895,
a dynamic was set in motion that was to play out repeatedly in the
future of Germany: First denial, then more dissemination of
information, then justi!cation of violence—mostly on racial
grounds.” (24) Above all, perhaps the most telling indication of the
continuity is the fact that Raphael Lemkin, who coined the word
“genocide,” was inspired by what had happened to Ottoman
Armenians. (25)
Critical historical research suggests a continuity and not a rupture
when it comes to locating the Holocaust in the context of 20th century
genocides. Elisabeth Weber’s discussion of the “exceptionality
paradigm” in Holocaust studies, as well as of its repercussions for
efforts to recognize the Armenian Genocide, not only supports my
point, but also hints at the connection between denialism and
exceptionalism. (26) The unwillingness on the part of Israel and the
U.S. to of!cially recognize the Armenian Genocide, accompanied by
the institutional efforts of the Turkish Republic in denialism, both
in Turkey and abroad, (27) leaves us to observe that still, in this day
and age, some can talk as if there is no concrete evidence to
support the claims of genocide. This poses a critical philosophical
problem, which I believe has a potential to expand the scope of
Continental studies of evil. My exploration of this problem
provides an example of a non-Eurocentric, interdisciplinary, and
transhistorical perspective––and an illustration of my initial
proposal to intervene in philosophy’s Eurocentric tendencies.
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